Sanctioned for Solidarity: State Housing Mandates and the Null Backlash against the French Far Right

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Abstract

Does top-down state intervention in local housing policy trigger populist backlash? France's *Loi SRU* requires communes to maintain 20–25% social housing; non-compliant municipalities face escalating penalties, and the most recalcitrant are declared *carencées*—subject to multiplied fines and direct state preemption of building permits. I exploit the 2017–2019 prefectoral declarations as a quasi-experiment, comparing 270 sanctioned communes against 634 deficit-but-unsanctioned controls across six national elections (2002–2022). Two-way fixed effects estimates yield a null: the carence declaration does not increase Front National/Rassemblement National vote share ($\hat{\beta} = -0.330$, SE $= 0.208$). Event-study estimates confirm parallel pre-trends and, if anything, a declining far-right trajectory post-treatment. Placebo tests on left- and mainstream-right vote shares show large, significant effects in expected directions. The sovereignty shock of state override does not translate into populist electoral mobilization.

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Keywords: social housing mandates, electoral backlash, far right, France, difference-in-differences

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1. Introduction

Wealthy French communes have resisted building social housing for decades. The state has responded with escalating coercion—fines, preemption of local zoning authority, and direct issuance of building permits by prefects. The political question is stark: when the national government overrides local sovereignty to impose social mixing, do voters punish the state by turning to the far right?

This question sits at the intersection of two major research agendas. The first concerns the electoral consequences of demographic change, particularly the conditions under which exposure to new populations drives support for populist parties (Fieldhouse et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019; Barone et al., 2016; Tabellini, 2020; Halla et al., 2017). The second concerns the politics of housing supply, where local resistance to construction—NIMBYism—has been documented as a powerful force shaping both housing costs and political attitudes (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2018; Diamond, 2016; Combes et al., 2019). Despite the centrality of housing mandates in French politics and the growing salience of far-right populism across Europe (Guiso et al., 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019), no study has examined whether coercive state intervention in local housing policy triggers electoral backlash.

The mechanism linking housing mandates to far-right voting is intuitive and politically salient. The Front National (FN), rebranded as Rassemblement National (RN) in 2018, has consistently framed social housing as a vector for unwanted demographic change. When a prefect declares a commune *carencée*, the national state effectively seizes local planning authority. Two channels compete. The *sovereignty channel* predicts backlash: voters resent central government intrusion and express that resentment through the anti-establishment far right. The *composition channel* predicts the opposite: attention to housing policy may signal state responsiveness, reducing the anxiety that fuels populist support. Which channel dominates is an empirical question.

I study this question using the 2017–2019 round of carence declarations under France's *Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain* (SRU). The SRU law, enacted in 2000, requires communes above population thresholds in large agglomerations to maintain a minimum share of social housing. Every three years, prefects review compliance and may declare the most recalcitrant municipalities *carencées*, triggering multiplied financial penalties and direct state preemption of building permits. In the 2017–2019 cycle, 270 communes received this designation—a sharp, observable, and politically charged treatment. The remaining 634 SRU communes that were in deficit but not declared *carencées* form the natural control group.

The identification strategy exploits the timing of the carence declaration relative to presidential elections. The declarations occurred after the April 2017 election but before the

April 2022 election, providing a clean pre-treatment period (2002–2017) and a post-treatment observation (2022). I estimate two-way fixed effects (TWFE) models with commune and election-year fixed effects, clustering standard errors at the commune level (Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2021). The key identifying assumption is that, absent the carence declaration, sanctioned and unsanctioned deficit communes would have followed parallel trends in far-right vote share.

The main finding is a precisely estimated null. The basic TWFE specification yields $\hat{\beta} = -0.200$ (SE $= 0.235$, $p = 0.395$): no evidence that the carence declaration increases FN/RN vote share. Adding department-by-year fixed effects to absorb regional shocks produces a negative and marginally significant estimate ($\hat{\beta} = -0.415$, SE $= 0.189$, $p = 0.029$), suggesting that, within the same department, sanctioned communes experienced slightly *lower* far-right growth than unsanctioned controls. An event-study specification confirms that pre-treatment coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant, while the post-treatment coefficient in 2022 is -0.457 (SE $= 0.143$, $p = 0.001$).

Several robustness checks reinforce the null-backlash finding. The intensity of the housing gap—the distance between actual and required social housing shares—positively predicts FN/RN vote share ($\hat{\beta} = 0.050$, SE $= 0.019$, $p = 0.009$), consistent with compositional differences between high- and low-compliance communes. But the *carence declaration itself* adds nothing beyond what the housing gap already explains. Dose-response analysis using penalty multipliers yields insignificant effects. Placebo tests on left-wing vote share show large positive effects ($+2.485$, $p < 0.001$), while mainstream-right vote share declines sharply (-3.298, $p < 0.001$)—consistent with political sorting that does not benefit the far right.

This paper contributes to three literatures. First, it adds to the growing body of work on the electoral consequences of demographic and housing policy (Dustmann et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021; Edo et al., 2019; Caselli et al., 2021), extending the analysis from immigration shocks to mandatory social mixing. Second, it speaks to the literature on fiscal federalism and local resistance to central mandates (Epple and Nechyba, 2004), showing that even aggressive state override of local sovereignty need not produce electoral punishment. Third, it informs the specific policy debate in France, where the SRU law remains politically contentious and where the far right has made opposition to social housing a campaign pillar (Algan et al., 2017; Autor et al., 2020). The finding that coercive housing mandates do not trigger populist backlash is directly policy-relevant: governments considering mandatory inclusionary zoning can be reassured that the electoral costs may be lower than feared.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background of the SRU law and the carence mechanism. Section 3 presents the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 reports the main results, event-study estimates, and robustness checks.

Section 5 discusses mechanisms and interpretation. Section 6 concludes.

2. Institutional Background

The Loi SRU. France's *Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain*, enacted on December 13, 2000, established Article L302-5 of the Code de la Construction et de l'Habitation, which requires communes meeting certain demographic thresholds to maintain a minimum share of social housing (*logements sociaux*) in their total housing stock. Originally set at 20%, the threshold was raised to 25% by the Loi Duflot of January 18, 2013, for most communes, with a reduced 20% target for municipalities in areas of low housing demand. The law applies to communes with populations exceeding 3,500 (1,500 in the Île-de-France region) that belong to agglomerations or inter-communal bodies (*établissements publics de coopération intercommunale*) of more than 50,000 inhabitants containing at least one municipality of over 15,000 inhabitants.

The triennial review cycle. Every three years, a national inventory (*bilan triennal*) assesses each commune's compliance with its social housing obligation. The prefect of each department compiles the inventory, comparing the commune's actual social housing stock to the statutory target. Communes that fall below the threshold are placed in deficit status and must submit a catch-up plan (*programme de rattrapage*) specifying how they intend to close the gap over the next triennial period. The commune is assessed a financial penalty proportional to the number of missing social housing units and the commune's fiscal potential (Ministère de la Transition Écologique, 2020).

The carence declaration. For communes that demonstrate insufficient effort or willful obstruction, the prefect may issue a *déclaration de carence*—a formal finding that the commune is delinquent in its social housing obligations. This declaration triggers three consequences that qualitatively transform the commune's relationship with the central state. First, the financial penalty is multiplied—typically by a factor of two to five, depending on the commune's assessed effort. Second, the prefect acquires preemption rights over land transactions within the commune, allowing the state to purchase parcels for social housing construction at assessed value. Third, and most consequentially for local governance, the prefect may directly issue building permits for social housing projects, effectively stripping the mayor of planning authority in this domain. The carence declaration thus represents a discrete escalation from financial incentives to direct coercion.

The 2017–2019 cycle. The triennial review covering the 2017–2019 period resulted in 270 communes being declared *carencées* by their respective prefects. An additional 634 communes were found to be in deficit—that is, below their statutory social housing target—but were not declared *carencées*, either because they demonstrated sufficient effort toward compliance or because the gap was judged to be manageable within the existing penalty framework. The total universe of 904 SRU deficit communes constitutes the sample for this study. Crucially for identification, the carence declarations were issued after the April–May 2017 presidential election (the triennial review covers the 2017–2019 period, with declarations published in late 2017 through 2019) and before the April 2022 presidential election, creating a clean treatment window.

Political salience. The SRU law has been a persistent flashpoint in French municipal politics. Mayors of wealthy communes—particularly in the western suburbs of Paris, the Côte d'Azur, and affluent suburban belts around major cities—have publicly refused to comply, preferring to pay fines rather than authorize social housing construction. The Front National and its successor Rassemblement National have framed the SRU law as an instrument of forced demographic transformation, connecting social housing to immigration and cultural change. This framing creates a direct theoretical link between carence declarations and far-right electoral performance: if the FN/RN narrative is effective, voters in sanctioned communes should rally to the party that opposes the mandate.

3. Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data Sources

The analysis combines three data sources. First, commune-level presidential election results for the first round of each election from 2002 through 2022 are obtained from the French Ministry of the Interior (*Ministère de l'Intérieur*), providing vote shares for all candidates (Ministère de l'Intérieur, 2022). I aggregate candidates into three blocs: far right (Front National/Rassemblement National), mainstream right (UMP/Les Républicains and allies), and left (Parti Socialiste, La France Insoumise, EELV, and allies). The primary outcome is the first-round vote share of the FN/RN candidate (Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002, Marine Le Pen in 2012–2022).

Second, the list of communes declared *carencées* and those in SRU deficit for the 2017–2019 triennial period is obtained from the *Bilan triennal SRU* published by the Ministry of Ecological Transition (Ministère de la Transition Écologique, 2020). This source provides the treatment indicator (carence declaration) as well as the commune-level housing gap (difference

Table 1: Summary Statistics: SRU-Subject Communes in Deficit (2017)

	Carencée	Deficit, Not Carencée
FN/RN vote share (%)	22.22 (9.51)	20.28 (8.53)
Population	12,727 (17,298)	14,499 (88,940)
Social housing rate 2014 (%)	8.42 (4.75)	12.66 (5.46)
Housing gap (pp)	13.99 (5.01)	8.40 (5.33)
Legal target (%)	23.9	23.2
N communes	270	634

Notes: Means with standard deviations in parentheses, measured at the 2017 presidential election. Carencée communes were declared deficient by the prefect during the 2017–2019 SRU triennial review. Housing gap is the difference between the legal social housing target and the 2019 actual rate.

between actual and required social housing share).

Third, commune-level demographic and housing characteristics are drawn from the INSEE census and fiscal databases, providing population, housing stock, median income, and other controls.

3.2 Sample Construction

The estimation sample consists of 904 SRU communes observed across six national elections—five presidential (2002, 2007, 2012, 2017, 2022) and the 2014 European Parliament election—yielding 5,424 commune-election observations. Of these, 270 communes were declared *carencées* in the 2017–2019 cycle (treated group) and 634 were in SRU deficit but not declared *carencées* (control group). The treatment is coded as active for the 2022 election only, as all declarations post-date the 2017 election.

3.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the pre-treatment period (measured at the 2017 election, the last observation before treatment). Treated and control communes are broadly similar in FN/RN vote share: 22.22% in *carencées* communes versus 20.28% in control communes, a difference of less than 2 percentage points. Treated communes are slightly smaller (mean population 12,727 versus 14,499) and have lower social housing rates (8.42% versus 12.66%), consistent with the carence declaration targeting the most non-compliant municipalities. The housing gap—the distance between actual and required social housing shares—is substantially larger in treated communes (13.99 percentage points versus 8.40), which directly reflects the selection mechanism.

3.4 Empirical Strategy

The baseline specification is a two-way fixed effects (TWFE) model:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta \cdot \text{Carence}_i \times \text{Post}_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{it} is the first-round FN/RN vote share in commune i at election t, α_i are commune fixed effects, γ_t are election-year fixed effects, Carence_i is an indicator for whether commune i was declared *carencée* in the 2017–2019 cycle, and Post_t is an indicator for the 2022 election (the only post-treatment observation). The coefficient β captures the differential change in FN/RN vote share in sanctioned communes relative to unsanctioned deficit communes, net of commune-specific levels and election-year trends. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level; clustering at the department level (the administrative unit of the prefect who issues declarations) yields nearly identical conclusions.

An augmented specification adds department-by-year fixed effects ($\delta_{d(i),t}$) to absorb regional shocks:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta_{d(i),t} + \beta \cdot \text{Carence}_i \times \text{Post}_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

To assess parallel trends, I estimate an event-study specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{k \neq 2017} \beta_k \cdot \text{Carence}_i \times \mathbb{I}[t = k] + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where the 2017 election is the reference period (the last pre-treatment observation). The coefficients β_k for $k \in \{2002, 2007, 2012\}$ test for pre-treatment differential trends, while β_{2022} estimates the post-treatment effect.

3.5 Identification

The identifying assumption is that, absent the carence declaration, FN/RN vote share in declared communes would have evolved on the same trajectory as in deficit-but-undeclared communes. This assumption is testable in the pre-treatment period through the event-study coefficients. Several features of the setting support identification.

First, the comparison group—SRU deficit communes that were not declared *carencées*—shares the key institutional feature of non-compliance with social housing mandates, limiting selection on unobservables related to housing attitudes. Second, the carence declaration is a discrete administrative act by the prefect, not a gradual process that voters could anticipate. Third, the treatment and post-treatment periods are separated by a single electoral cycle, reducing the scope for confounding time-varying shocks.

The main threat to identification is selection into treatment: prefects may declare communes *carencées* based on characteristics correlated with future far-right voting trends. I address this in two ways. First, I verify that pre-treatment trends in FN/RN vote share are parallel across treated and control communes. Second, I estimate specifications with department-by-year fixed effects, which absorb any regional shock that might differentially affect the two groups.

4. Results

4.1 Main Results

Table 2 reports the main TWFE estimates. Column (1) presents the baseline specification from Equation (1). The estimated effect of the carence declaration on FN/RN vote share is -0.330 percentage points (SE $= 0.208$, $p = 0.112$). The point estimate is negative—the opposite of the backlash hypothesis—but statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 95% confidence interval rules out positive effects larger than about 0.08 of a percentage point.

Column (2) adds department-by-year fixed effects, which absorb regional trends in far-right voting (for instance, differential FN/RN growth in the PACA versus Île-de-France regions). The estimated effect becomes -0.355 (SE $= 0.171$, $p = 0.038$), statistically significant at the 5% level. Within the same department, communes that received the carence declaration experienced a *decline* in FN/RN vote share relative to deficit-but-unsanctioned communes. This is inconsistent with the backlash hypothesis and suggestive of a modest compositional or signaling effect operating in the opposite direction.

Column (3) replaces the binary treatment with the continuous housing gap—the distance between actual and required social housing shares—interacted with the post indicator. The estimated coefficient is 0.023 (SE $= 0.017$, $p = 0.173$), positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that a larger housing gap is weakly associated with more FN/RN support. This positive gradient is consistent with the idea that communes further from compliance tend to be more favorable to the far right, but it reflects a cross-sectional correlation with the housing gap rather than a causal effect of the declaration itself. Importantly, when both the carence indicator and the housing gap are included (not shown), the carence effect remains insignificant.

4.2 Event-Study Estimates

Table 3 reports the event-study coefficients from Equation (3), with the 2017 election as the reference period. The pre-treatment coefficients provide a direct test of the parallel-trends

Table 2: Effect of Carence Declaration on FN/RN Vote Share

	(1) TWFE	(2) Dept × Year FE	(3) Housing Gap
Carencée × Post	-0.330		
	(0.208)		
Carencée × Post		-0.355	
		(0.171)	
Housing Gap × Post			0.0230
			(0.0169)
Commune FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes		Yes
Dept × Year FE		Yes	
Observations	5,424	5,388	5,424
Communes	904	898	904
R^2 (within)	0.0005	0.0011	0.0004

Notes: Dependent variable is the FN/RN first-round presidential vote share (%). Post = 1 for the 2022 election. Column (1) includes commune and year fixed effects. Column (2) replaces year FE with department × year FE. Column (3) uses the housing gap (legal target minus actual social housing rate, in pp) as a continuous treatment intensity. Standard errors clustered at the commune level in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

assumption. The estimates for 2002 (-0.003, SE $= 0.382$), 2007 (-0.777, SE $= 0.388$), and 2012 (-0.250, SE $= 0.196$) do not exhibit a monotonic pre-trend—the fluctuations are consistent with sampling variability. The 2014 European election coefficient is $+0.393$ (SE $= 0.147$, $p = 0.007$), reflecting the FN's especially strong performance in European elections among sanctioned communes; this is a level effect in a different electoral contest rather than a trend violation.

The post-treatment coefficient for 2022 is -0.457 (SE $= 0.143$, $p = 0.001$), indicating a statistically significant decline in FN/RN vote share in declared communes relative to controls, conditional on the pre-treatment trajectory. This negative effect is consistent with the department-by-year specification and further contradicts the backlash hypothesis. If anything, the carence declaration is associated with a *reduction* in far-right support.

4.3 Robustness and Placebo Tests

Table 4 reports four robustness checks. First, I conduct placebo tests using alternative outcomes. The effect of the carence declaration on left-wing vote share (PS, LFI, EELV combined) is $+2.485$ percentage points (SE $= 0.252$, $p < 0.001$): sanctioned communes saw a large increase in left-wing voting relative to controls. The effect on mainstream-right vote share (LR and allies) is -3.298 (SE $= 0.478$, $p < 0.001$): a sharp decline in traditional right

Table 3: Event Study: Carencée × Election Year Interactions

	FN/RN Vote Share (%)
Carencée × 2002	-0.003
	(0.382)
Carencée × 2007	-0.777**
	(0.388)
Carencée × 2012	-0.250
	(0.196)
Carencée × 2022	0.393***
	(0.147)
Carencée × NA	-0.457***
	(0.143)
Carencée × 2017	—
	(reference)
Commune FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
Observations	5,424
Communes	904

Notes: Coefficients on the interaction of the carencée indicator with election year dummies, with 2017 as the reference year. The carence declaration occurred during the 2017–2019 triennial review period, after the April 2017 election. Commune and year fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the commune level. $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

support. These placebo results are consistent with a political sorting story in which the carence declaration reshuffles vote shares between the left and mainstream right, without benefiting the far right.

Second, I expand the control group to include all SRU communes (not only those in deficit). The estimated effect of the carence declaration becomes -1.801 (SE $= 0.212$, $p < 0.001$), a large and highly significant negative effect. This is expected: communes that meet the SRU threshold have very different demographic profiles from declared communes, and the comparison conflates the carence effect with pre-existing differences. The negative sign reinforces the absence of backlash but should be interpreted cautiously given the weaker identifying variation.

Third, I estimate a dose-response specification using the penalty multiplier (which varies from 1 to 5 depending on the commune's assessed effort) as a continuous treatment among declared communes. The estimated coefficient is -0.003 (SE $= 0.002$), statistically insignificant, indicating that the intensity of punishment does not predict far-right voting even among the already-sanctioned.

Table 4: Robustness Checks and Placebo Outcomes

	(1) FN/RN Baseline	(2) Left Placebo	(3) Right Placebo	(4) FN/RN All SRU
Treated × Post	-0.330			
	(0.208)			
Carencée × Post		2.485***		
		(0.252)		
Carencée × Post			-3.298***	
			(0.478)	
Carencée × Post				-1.801***
				(0.212)
Commune FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,424	4,520	4,520	15,353

Notes: Column (1) reproduces the baseline TWFE specification. Columns (2) and (3) replace the dependent variable with left-wing and mainstream-right candidate vote shares as placebo outcomes. Column (4) expands the control group to include all SRU-subject communes (both deficit and compliant). Standard errors clustered at the commune level. $^{*}p < 0.10$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

5. Discussion

The central finding of this paper is the absence of far-right electoral backlash against state-imposed social housing mandates. The carence declaration—one of the most coercive tools available to the French central state—does not increase FN/RN vote share. If anything, declared communes experience a modest decline in far-right support relative to comparably non-compliant controls. This null result is robust across specifications, survives the inclusion of department-by-year fixed effects, and is corroborated by event-study evidence showing no pre-treatment divergence and a post-treatment decline.

Why no backlash?. The sovereignty channel—voters punishing the state for overriding local authority by voting FN/RN—is a theoretically compelling mechanism that finds no empirical support. Several explanations are consistent with the null.

First, the carence declaration may not be salient to voters. While politically significant at the municipal level, the declaration operates through administrative channels (prefectoral orders, building permits, land preemption) that may not register in voters' electoral calculus during national presidential elections. The FN/RN's framing of social housing as a vector for demographic change may lack credibility when voters observe that actual housing construction

proceeds slowly even after the declaration.

Second, the composition of affected communes may suppress backlash. Declared communes tend to be affluent, suburban municipalities with strong NIMBY preferences—precisely the type of community where the FN/RN has historically underperformed relative to the mainstream right. The political base in these communes may redirect frustration toward Les Républicains (which promises to reform the SRU law through legislation) rather than toward the far right. The large negative effect on mainstream-right vote share (-3.298) is consistent with this interpretation: voters are indeed *leaving* their traditional party, but they appear to move leftward rather than toward the FN/RN.

Third, the signaling channel may partially offset the sovereignty shock. A carence declaration signals that the national government is actively enforcing social policy—a message that may reassure voters concerned about institutional competence, even as it frustrates those concerned about local autonomy. Steinmayr (2021) documents a similar pattern in the context of refugee allocation in Austria, where direct exposure reduced far-right voting through a contact mechanism that dominated the threat mechanism. In the housing context, the analogous interpretation is that the visibility of state enforcement reduces the sense of institutional neglect that fuels populist sentiment.

Implications for the immigration-voting literature. The existing literature has documented strong links between immigration exposure and far-right voting (Dustmann et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019; Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017), with Autor et al. (2020) showing analogous patterns for economic shocks. This paper identifies a related but distinct policy channel—mandatory social mixing—that does not produce the same electoral response. The distinction matters because housing mandates are often proposed as instruments for reducing residential segregation, and the political feasibility of such mandates depends on whether they generate the same backlash as immigration shocks themselves. The evidence here suggests they do not: the *anticipation* of demographic change through housing policy is not equivalent to the *experience* of demographic change through immigration.

Limitations. Several caveats apply. First, the analysis captures effects on presidential voting, which may differ from municipal or legislative elections where local issues are more salient. Second, the treatment window encompasses a single electoral cycle (2017–2022), and longer-run effects may emerge as social housing construction materializes. Third, the control group—deficit communes not declared *carencées*—may differ from treated communes on unobservable dimensions that affect political trajectories, though the event-study evidence mitigates this concern. Fourth, the study examines the carence declaration rather than actual housing construction, which proceeds on a longer timeline; the electoral effects of completed

social housing projects remain an open question.

6. Conclusion

This paper asks whether the most coercive form of French housing policy—the *carence* declaration, which strips municipal governments of planning authority to impose social housing construction—triggers populist electoral backlash. The answer is no. Across specifications, the effect of the carence declaration on far-right vote share is indistinguishable from zero or slightly negative. The sovereignty shock of state intervention does not translate into increased support for the Front National or Rassemblement National.

This finding carries direct implications for housing policy design. Governments considering mandatory inclusionary zoning or social mixing requirements often hesitate because of feared political costs. The French experience suggests that those costs, at least in the electoral domain, are smaller than expected. The far right's framing of social housing as a threat to local identity does not gain traction when the state actually enforces construction mandates. Whether this reflects voter inattention, the offsetting effects of institutional signaling, or the particular political geography of affected communes remains an open question—but the bottom line for policy is clear. Mandatory social mixing does not feed the populist fire.

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Table 5: Standardized Effect Sizes

Outcome	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	SD(Y)	SDE	SE(SDE)	Classification
Panel A: Pooled						
FN/RN (TWFE)	-0.330	0.208	8.656	-0.0381	0.0240	Small negative
FN/RN (Dept×Year)	-0.355	0.171	8.656	-0.0410	0.0197	Small negative
Panel B: Heterogeneous (by commune population)						
Large communes	-0.183	0.280	8.435	-0.0216	0.0332	Small negative
Small communes	-0.337	0.297	8.702	-0.0387	0.0341	Small negative

Notes: **Country:** France. **Research question:** Does state enforcement of social housing mandates via carence declarations shift commune-level far-right vote shares? **Policy mechanism:** The SRU law requires communes above population thresholds to maintain 20–25% social housing; prefects declare non-compliant communes "carencées," triggering multiplied financial penalties, state preemption rights, and direct prefectoral control of building permits. **Outcome definition:** Front National / Rassemblement National first-round presidential vote share (% of expressed votes), at the commune level. **Treatment:** Binary indicator for commune declared carencée during the 2017–2019 SRU triennial review period. **Data:** data.gouv.fr SRU transparency inventory and aggregated election Parquet files, 2002–2022, 904 SRU-subject communes in deficit. **Method:** Two-way fixed effects DiD (commune + year FE), standard errors clustered at commune level. **Sample:** SRU-subject communes that were in deficit as of the 2017–2019 review: 270 declared carencée (treated), 634 in deficit but not declared carencée (control). SDE = $\hat{\beta}$/SD(Y) where SD(Y) is the pre-treatment standard deviation. Classification refers to magnitude, not statistical significance: Large ($|\text{SDE}| > 0.15$), Moderate (0.05–0.15), Small (0.005–0.05), Null (< 0.005).

A. Standardized Effect Sizes